@aptos-labs/ts-sdk/dist/cli/spawnArgs.d.ts

Aptos TypeScript SDK

/**
 * Validates that a CLI argument does not contain shell metacharacters that
 * could be interpreted by the shell when passed via `spawn(..., { shell: true })`.
 *
 * @throws Error if `arg` contains any unsafe shell character.
 */
export declare function assertSafeCliArg(arg: string): void;
/**
 * Validates every element of an args array. See {@link assertSafeCliArg}.
 */
export declare function assertSafeCliArgs(args: ReadonlyArray<string>): void;
/**
 * Validates a single CLI argument and returns a copy with any shell
 * metacharacters stripped out.
 *
 * {@link assertSafeCliArg} already rejects every shell metacharacter, so the
 * scrubbing chain below is a runtime no-op for any argument that passes
 * validation. We keep it as defense-in-depth and, importantly, so that static
 * analysis (e.g. CodeQL's "Unsafe shell command constructed from library
 * input" query) can see that the value flowing into `spawn(..., { shell: true })`
 * on Windows has been stripped of shell metacharacters. CodeQL only recognizes
 * a sequence of `String.prototype.replace` calls that covers every shell
 * metacharacter as a sanitizer barrier; a `RegExp.test`-based guard in a
 * separate function is not enough to break the tracked data flow.
 *
 * The chain strips every character that {@link UNSAFE_SHELL_CHARS}/
 * {@link assertSafeCliArg} reject, so the scrub is a complete superset of the
 * validation blocklist rather than only the subset CodeQL requires.
 *
 * @returns the validated argument with shell metacharacters removed.
 * @throws Error if `arg` contains any unsafe shell character.
 */
export declare function sanitizeCliArg(arg: string): string;
/**
 * Validates and scrubs every element of an args array, returning the sanitized
 * array that should be passed to `spawn`. See {@link sanitizeCliArg}.
 */
export declare function sanitizeCliArgs(args: ReadonlyArray<string>): string[];
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